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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following two hypotheticals: 
 Elizabeth, an 18 year old high school graduate, applies for a cashier 
position at a prominent national retailer.  Following a successful interview, she is 
offered the position and presented with an employment contract to sign on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.  The employment agreement includes a waiver of 
Elizabeth’s right to a jury trial.  Elizabeth signs the agreement.  Elizabeth works 
for the retailer full-time for five years and in that time is promoted to shift 
supervisor.  She notices, however, that all male employees with similar 
performance reviews and seniority have been promoted to store managers.  
Elizabeth strongly believes that she has been denied opportunities for promotion 
on the basis of her gender and decides to sue her employer.  Elizabeth takes her 
case to various plaintiff’s attorneys but none will take it for fear that her jury trial 
waiver will result in a de minimis recovery.  Undaunted, Elizabeth files a lawsuit 
against her employer in pro per. Throughout the litigation, she makes critical 
mistakes due to her legal inexperience.  Finally, her employer offers her 
$5000.00 to settle the matter.  Elizabeth accepts the settlement. 
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2Sarah, an 18 year old high school graduate, applies for a cashier position at 
a prominent national grocer.  Following a successful interview, she is offered the 
position and presented with an employment contract to sign on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.  The employment agreement does not include a waiver of Sarah’s 
right to a jury trial.  Sarah signs the agreement.  Sarah works for the grocer full-
time for five years and in that time is promoted to shift supervisor.  She notices, 
however, that all male employees with similar performance reviews and seniority 
have been promoted to store managers.  Like Elizabeth, Sarah strongly believes 
that she has been denied opportunities for promotion on the basis of her gender 
and decides to sue her employer.  Sarah takes her case to various plaintiff’s 
attorneys.  After reviewing the facts of Sarah’s case and weighing the likely 
outcome of a jury trial, a prominent plaintiff’s attorney takes her case on 
contingency.  The attorney helps Sarah amass substantial evidence of gender 
discrimination by her employer.  Sarah’s attorney contacts her employer and 
threatens to sue.  During the subsequent negotiations, Sarah’s attorney makes it 
clear that they are prepared to take the case to the jury.  Before the suit is even 
filed, Sarah’s employer offers to settle the case for $1,000,000.00, which Sarah 
accepts.       
 As exemplified by the foregoing hypotheticals, a jury trial waiver can 
significantly affect the perceived value of a plaintiff’s case.  Indeed, in 2004, the 
U.S. Department of Justice found that the amount awarded to plaintiff winners 
varied significantly depending on whether the case was decided by a jury or a 
3judge.1 The difference between the award amounts was particularly striking in 
employment discrimination cases, where plaintiff winners were awarded a 
median of $218,000 from juries as compared to only $40,000 from judges.2 Not 
surprisingly, many employers have sought to avoid the greater risk inherent in 
jury trials by requiring their employees to use alternate dispute resolution 
methods such as arbitration.3 But the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration 
agreements in the employment context carries its own distinct disadvantages.4
Accordingly, some commentators are advocating for increased use of pre-dispute 
contractual jury waivers as a way to manage employment litigation risk.5
But while jury waivers can be an attractive alternative to arbitration on the 
one hand and jury trials on the other, judicial treatment of such waivers has been 
quite varied.6 Two state supreme courts, California and Georgia, have ruled that 
1 Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K. Smith, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN app. F, at 5-6 (Apr. 2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ctcvlc01.htm.
2 Id. at 6.  The survey found that the median amount awarded to plaintiff winners in federal district courts 
was also higher in jury trial cases than in bench trial cases.  Id. at 7.  Although the survey did not specify  
the median award amount in federal employment discrimination cases, it found that the median award in 
federal jury trial cases involving “contract,” a category which included employment discrimination cases, 
was $330,000 as compared to only $226,000 in bench trial cases.  Id. at 7, 10-11.   
3
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5 See, e.g., LaRocca, supra note 3, at 954-959 (arguing that jury trial waivers allow employers and 
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2005) (suggesting that employers use jury waivers in lieu of arbitration); Harold M. Brody and Anthony J. 
Oncidi, Careful What You Wish For: Is Arbitration the Employer’s Panacea?  Perhaps There is a Better 
Alternative, 9 No. 6 HR Advisor: Legal & Practical Guidance 7 (noting that jury trial waivers, as opposed 
to arbitration, are a “better way to shield employers from the risk and expense associated with jury trials”); 
Samuel Estreicher and Rene M. Johnson, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Employment 
Litigation, N.Y.L.J. (May 2, 2003) at 3 (noting that “practitioners are increasingly considering contractual 
jury trial waivers”).
6 See infra, Part II.B & C.
4pre-dispute contractual jury waivers are not enforceable.7 Those jurisdictions 
that permit such waivers use a wide array of “safeguards not typical of 
commercial law”8 to protect the constitutional right to jury trial. The multiple 
safeguards used by courts, and the different ways of applying them led the 
California Supreme Court to note “the difficulties experienced in other 
jurisdictions [with respect to pre-dispute jury waivers], where disagreements 
persist concerning such matters as allocation of the burden of proof when a party 
resists enforcement of a contractual waiver of jury trial.”9 These disagreements 
must be settled before employers and employees can use such waivers 
appropriately and effectively.   
 This Article resolves the burden of proof question by arguing that several 
factors support assigning the burden of proof to the party seeking enforcement of 
the waiver, which in employer-employee disputes will usually be the employer.  
Allocating the proof burden in this way will standardize judicial treatment of pre-
dispute jury waivers, allowing employers and employees to use them optimally to 
manage the risks of dispute resolution.   
 Part I of this Article assesses the use of pre-dispute jury waivers in the 
employment context and explains their appeal to employers and employees alike.  
Part II analyzes the various ways that federal courts have treated pre-dispute jury 
7
 See Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 944, 961, 116 P.3d 479, 488 (2005) (holding 
that state statute does not authorize pre-dispute waiver of the right to jury trial); Bank South N.A. v. 
Howard, 264 Ga. 339, 340, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (1994) (holding that neither the Georgia constitution nor  
state statute provide for pre-litigation contractual waivers of jury trial).
8 Grafton Partners L.P., 36 Cal. 4th at 965 & 966 n.12.  For a more extensive discussion of the safeguards 
used by courts, see infra, note 54 & accompanying text.
9 Grafton Partners L.P., 36 Cal. 4th at 966; see also Shultz, supra note 5 (“It is safe to assume that lawyers 
who represent employees will challenge the validity of jury waiver agreements.”); Brody & Oncidi, supra
note 5, at 7 (noting that there is “little guidance” regarding “whether, when and how an employer may 
implement a jury trail waiver program”).  For a more extensive discussion of the disagreements between 
various jurisdictions, see infra, Part II.B.  
5waivers and notes specific inconsistencies in the treatment of such waivers in 
several recent federal employment cases.  Part III argues that in the employment 
context, public policy considerations, and convenience and fairness concerns, all 
call for assigning the burden of proof to the party seeking enforcement of the 
waiver.     
I. Pre-Dispute Contractual Jury Waivers
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes a 
constitutional right to a jury trial in legal actions in federal court, including 
diversity jurisdiction cases.10 In addition, federal employment law statutes such 
as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1994) (“Title VII”) and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (2000) (“ADEA”) grant 
jury trial rights.11 From a risk management perspective, however, many 
employers find a jury’s legendary unpredictability to be unacceptable.12 
A. The Problem With Juries
Most employers believe that juries are more likely to find against wealthy 
or corporate defendants than judges and more likely to award large damages to 
plaintiff winners than judges.13 Furthermore, according to prevailing wisdom, 
juries generally “favor the little guy against the big one, the simpler case rather 
than the one more difficult to understand, local interests rather than those 
10
 U.S. Const. amend. VII; Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (amending Title VII to permit jury trials); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (granting jury 
trial rights under the ADEA).
12
 Robert S. Blumberg and Ariel D. Weindling, A|S|A|P, A Littler Mendelson Time Sensitive Newsletter, 
California Edition (August 2005), available at, 
http://www.littler.com/presspublications/index.cfm?event=pubItem&pubItemID=12181&childViewID=25
0&type=all (“Among the greatest fears of many employers is the chance that a runaway jury could impose 
a potentially ruinous verdict in a wrongful discharge or harassment matter.”); see Shultz, supra note 5 
(“Jury trials . . . are notoriously unpredictable. . . . mak[ing] it difficult to assess the wisdom of a decision to 
continue or settle.”).
13
  Jerry Custis, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, § 8:32 (December 2004).
6situated farther away, emotional appeals to right versus wrong rather than strict 
application of the law and more attractive witnesses rather than those lacking a 
cordial appearance.”14 These concerns have motivated many employers to adopt 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to handle employment disputes.   
 A substantial number of employers currently use arbitration.15 By 
submitting disputes to an arbitrator rather than to a jury, both employers and 
employees expect reduced costs, faster resolutions, greater privacy and increased 
predictability.16 But recently, numerous concerns have been raised regarding the 
continued use of arbitrators in employment disputes.  
B. The Problem With Arbitration
Critics of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements argue that by 
providing a private, less costly way for employees to bring discrimination claims, 
such agreements expose employers to a greater number of discrimination 
claims.17 Employers are also finding that arbitration does not offer a significant 
improvement over litigation in terms of time and costs saved.  Experience has 
shown that resolution times for disputes that are arbitrated are not significantly 
faster than disputes that are litigated in court.18 Moreover, arbitrators typically 
do not grant summary judgment, further prolonging the case and increasing 
14 Id.
15
  Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that a “substantial number” of employers “employing 
millions of employees” have adopted arbitration); see Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Judicial 
Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 249, 
252 (2003) (“The substitution of mandatory arbitration for discrimination lawsuits is the most significant 
employment law development since the early 1990s.”); LaRocca, supra note 3, at 933-34 (writing that in 
1997, 19% of private sector employers were using arbitration and that in 2001, 6 million employees were 
covered by employment arbitration plans administered by the American Arbitration Association).
16
   LaRocca, supra note 3, at 935-37.
17 Id. at 938-42; see Shultz, supra note 5 (writing that arbitration may encourage claims).
18 Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7.
7costs.19 Arbitration costs also include fees for preparing and conducting the 
arbitration, and deciding discovery disputes and law and motion proceedings—all 
costs which are publicly funded in a court proceeding.20 This is a particular 
burden on employers as they are often saddled with the entire cost of the 
arbitration.21 
Arbitrating a dispute also requires both employers and employees to 
accept procedures that may differ from those provided by statute, as well as 
limited judicial recourse in the event of an adverse outcome.22 There is also 
continuing debate in the courts, as well as among commentators, regarding the 
judicial enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements.23 
19
   Shultz, supra note 5 (writing that arbitrators “seldom dismiss cases without a hearing, even when there 
is no arguable basis for a claim”); Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (stating that arbitration is often not 
much faster than, and can be as expensive as, court litigation, that arbitrators rarely grant motions for 
summary judgment and that arbitrators often “split-the-baby” and issue compromise awards).
20
   LaRocca, supra note 3, at 939.
21 See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that plaintiff’s attorneys often do not oppose arbitration 
because they can litigate “largely at the employer’s expense”).
22
  LaRocca, supra note 3, at 940; see LeRoy, supra note 3, at 777-780 (noting that the use of arbitrators as
adjudicators of employment disputes is now questioned due to, inter alia, high damages awards and 
extremely deferential standard of judicial review).
23
  Leroy & Feuille, supra note 15, at 313-326 (noting “surprising evidence of judicial resistance to these 
mandatory [arbitration] arrangements.”).  Much has been written regarding how mandatory arbitration 
agreements should be enforced, if at all.  See generally, Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration 
and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 669 (2001) 
(arguing that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial should limit the ability of parties to impose 
binding arbitration).  Some argue that a knowing and voluntary standard of consent should be applied to 
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements.  See id.; Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and 
Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of 
Employment, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1203, 1208 (2002); but see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-
Waiver Clauses, and other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67-SPG Law & Contemp. Probs. 
167, 168 (Winter/Spring 2004) (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act cannot “plausibly be interpreted to 
require knowing consent or any other standards of consent except those used by contract law”).  Still others 
argue that it is inequitable to enforce executory agreements to arbitrate between employers and employees.  
See generally, Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of 
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 449 (1996).
8All of these problems with arbitration have spurred many employers to 
reconsider the use of arbitration to resolve employment disputes.24 
C. Are Pre-Dispute Jury Waivers The Solution?
EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ALL RIGHT 
TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY ACTION, PROCEEDING OR 
COUNTERCLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS 
AGREEMENT.25 
Pre-dispute contractual jury waivers such as the one supra, are 
increasingly being used by employers as an alternative way to mitigate risk.26 
Such waivers offer some of the benefits of both arbitration and jury trials.  Like a 
jury trial, a bench trial allows parties to take full advantage of our court system 
because they provide litigants with procedural and evidentiary protections that 
may not otherwise be available in arbitration.27 Judges are generally more 
receptive to dispositive motions than arbitrators.28 Court proceedings also 
permit greater post-judgment judicial review than is available following an 
arbitration award.29 
24 See Ryan Griffitts, Jury Waiver Agreements Revisted, Thompson Coe Labor & Employment News 2 
(Spring 2005), available at http://www.thompsoncoe.com/Portals/0/LEN-06-02.pdf (law firm newsletter 
noting more employers are using jury waivers in their employment agreements).
25
  This pre-dispute jury waiver is reproduced from an actual employment agreement that was litigated in 
federal court.  Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., 2004 WL 306110, at *1, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26639 
(S.D.Iowa Jan. 29, 2004) (emphasis original).
26
 Blumberg & Weindling, supra note 12 (stating that many employers use pre dispute jury waivers to 
avoid “the great uncertainty which comes with jury trial, while both avoiding the cost of arbitration and 
retaining the right to appeal”); see Shultz, supra note 5 (writing that a jury waiver diminishes the value of a 
plaintiff’s case); LeRoy, supra note 3, at 769 (noting some employers are discarding arbitration in favor of 
jury waivers).
27
   LaRocca, supra note 3, at 955 (“Because a judge is bound by Title VII and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, employees [and employers] are guaranteed appropriate statute of limitations, unbiased selection 
of the decision maker, appropriate cost allocations, judicial expertise, full appellate rights, appropriate 
punitive damages, and appropriate remedies.”).
28
   Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7.
29
   Estreicher & Johnson, supra note 5, at 1.
9Much like arbitration, bench trials offer potentially significant time and 
cost savings when compared to jury trials.   This is because bench trials are 
generally concluded much faster than jury trials.30 In addition, in a bench trial, 
parties are spared the costs of selecting a jury, tailoring the case to a jury, and 
settling jury instructions.31 Finally, submitting a dispute to a judge rather than a 
jury minimizes employers’ fears of excessive jury awards.32 
In certain situations, a pre-dispute contractual jury waiver can offer clear 
advantages to both employer and employee and serve as “an attractive middle 
ground between jury trials, on the one hand, and arbitration, on the other.”33 But 
as use of such waivers has increased, serious questions have arisen regarding 
their treatment in the courts.34 Part II of this Article examines the disparate ways 
federal courts, and in particular federal courts adjudicating employment 
disputes,35 have analyzed pre-dispute contractual jury waivers. 
II. Judicial Treatment of Pre-Dispute Jury Waivers
30 Cohen & Smith, supra note 1, at table 2 & 8 (Apr. 2004) (stating that 77% of non-jury cases were 
decided within 2 years as compared to only 56.9% of jury cases, and that jury trials lasted an average of 4.3 
days compared to only 1.9 days for bench trials).
31
   Custis, supra note 13, at § 8:32.
32 See Grafton Partners L.P., 36 Cal. 4th 944 at 969 (Chin, J. concurring)
33 Grafton Partners LP v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 511, 519 n. 12 (Cal. App. 2004) (“Agreements to 
resolve future disputes by court trial may alleviate fears of excessive jury awards while providing greater 
procedural protections than arbitration in many respects, including discovery, securing an impartial 
factfinder, and appeal, among others. It is noteworthy that the reduction of such rights in the arbitral forum, 
as well as the unique costs imposed by arbitration, have troubled California courts . . .”).
34 See infra Part II.
35
   This Article limits its scope to federal employment cases because federal statutes and federal 
employment claims make up a prominent portion of the body of employment law and most plaintiffs with 
both federal and state employment claims will end up litigating their claims in a federal court.  See Michael 
D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically: Rethinking Parallel State and Federal Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 18 Whittier L. Rev. 499, 502-03 (1997) (writing that “individuals who pursue their state and 
federal rights in the same proceeding may be required to litigate those rights in a federal forum, because an 
employer against whom both state and federal claims are brought in state court ordinarily can remove the 
entire action to federal court”); Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: 
Comment on Macey, 23 J. Legal Stud. 647, 664 n. 69 (1994) (noting employers routinely remove 
employment discrimination cases filed in state court to federal court). 
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The right to a trial by jury in a civil lawsuit may be waived by a prior 
written agreement.36 Federal courts examining pre-dispute jury waivers have 
overwhelmingly applied the knowing and voluntary consent standard to such 
waivers.37 But critically, the courts have not agreed whether the party seeking to 
enforce or the party seeking to avoid the waiver should bear the burden of proof 
that the waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily.38 
This Part reviews judicial treatment of contractual jury waivers and 
discusses several recent federal district court cases that confronted such waivers 
in the context of an employer-employee dispute.  
A. Knowing Consent Requirement
Prior to the 1970s, most courts examined contractual jury waivers using 
contract law standards of consent.39 As stated by Professor Stephen J. Ware:  
Under contract law’s objective standards of consent, signing (or otherwise 
manifesting assent to) such a document is, with few exceptions, consent to 
the terms on the document.  The signature’s “blanket assent” is good 
enough.  Neither reading nor understanding the terms is necessary to 
make those terms enforceable.40 
36 See, e.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp.  859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Agreements 
waiving the right to trial by jury are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy,”); K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. 
Irving Trust Co.  757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985) (“It is clear that the parties to a contract may by prior 
written agreement waive the right to jury trial.”); Cooperative Finance Ass'n., Inc. v. Garst 871 F.Supp. 
1168, 1171 (N.D.Iowa 1995) (collecting cases).
37 See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 756 (citing, National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 
258 (2d Cir.1977)); Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Pub. Group, LLC, 2004 WL 1661073, at *11,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14153 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004) (citing, Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 
F.Supp.2d 602, 603 (S.D.N.Y.1999)); Morris, 2004 WL 306110, at *1 (citing, Cooperative Finance Ass'n., 
Inc. v. Garst 871 F.Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D.Iowa 1995)); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 
572 F.Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.1983); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F.Supp. 402, 403 
(D.Colo.1982).
38 Grafton Partners L.P., 36 Cal. 4th at 966 n.12 (2005); see Medical Air Technology Corp. v. Marwan 
Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The circuits are currently split on the question of which party
bears the burden of proof as to whether a contractual jury trial waiver was knowing and voluntary.”). 
39
   Ware, supra note 23, at 201-202; Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in 
Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 431, 444-447 (1997).
40
   Ware, supra note 23, at 171.
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In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became one of the first 
courts to articulate a knowing-consent requirement in the context of contractual 
jury waivers.41 In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix,42 H. Walter 
Hendrix, III (“Hendrix”) purchased a tractor-scraper and a bulldozer from two 
separate dealers that he was subsequently unable to pay for.43 Hendrix 
approached National Equipment Rental, Ltd. (“NER”) for a loan to settle his 
accounts with the two dealers.44 The loan agreements were characterized by NER 
as “equipment leases.”45 Hendrix eventually defaulted and NER seized the 
tractor-scraper and the bulldozer.46 NER sold the equipment and sued Hendrix 
to collect the remaining balance due on the two leases.47 A jury found that the 
lease agreements were actually usurious loan agreements void under New York 
State law.48 NER appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Hendrix was improperly 
granted a jury trial in the face of a contractual clause in the leases waiving such a 
right.49 Affirming the trial court’s decision to grant Hendrix’s demand for a jury 
trial despite having signed a contractual pre-dispute jury waiver, the Second 
Circuit reasoned: 
It is elementary that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is 
fundamental and that its protection can only be relinquished knowingly 
and intentionally. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 
1461 (1938); Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 847, 93 S.Ct. 53, 34 L.Ed.2d 88 (1972). Indeed, a 
41 Id. at 202.
42
   565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
43 Id. at 256.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 257.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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presumption exists against its waiver. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy,
301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937).50 
The Hendrix court found that the jury waiver clause at issue “fail[ed] to 
overcome this presumption. . . . [because it] was set deeply and inconspicuously 
in the contract.”51 The court further found that the waiver was neither knowing 
nor intentional in light of the “gross inequality in bargaining power” between the 
parties, given that Hendrix “did not have any choice but to accept the . . . contract 
as written if he was to get badly needed funds.”52 
After Hendrix, courts have consistently applied the knowing consent 
standard to jury waivers, characterizing it using such words as “knowing,” 
“voluntary” and/or “intentional.”53 As Professor Sternlight observes: 
While courts have not adopted an identical phrasing of the factors to be 
considered in examining contractual jury trial waivers, there is substantial 
50
   565 F.2d 255, 258.  There is considerable scholarship discussing whether the knowing consent standard 
established in Hendrix was adequately supported by precedent.  First, the Hendrix court fails to 
acknowledge that it relied on a criminal case involving jury waiver (where courts have long applied higher 
consent standards for constitutional waivers) and a case involving an attorney’s oral waiver during a 
pretrial conference (as distinguished from a pre-dispute contractual waiver) for this standard.  See Ware, 
supra note 23, at 203; Matties, supra note 39, at 446-447.  Second, while the Hendrix court acknowledges 
that the Supreme Court upheld the contractual waiver of the right to personal service without employing a 
knowing consent standard in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 
L.Ed.2d 354 (1964), the court distinguishes Szukhent by stating that “the right to a jury trial . . . is far more 
fundamental than the right to personal service, and cannot be waived absent a showing that its 
relinquishment is knowing and intentional.”  565 F.2d 255, 258 n.1.  Curiously, the Hendrix court provides 
no authority or reasoning for such a statement or to explain “why the standard for civil waivers of 
constitutional rights should differ when the right is found in the Seventh Amendment as opposed to the Due 
Process Clause.” Ware, supra note 23, at 203; see Matties, supra note 39, at 447.  Indeed, Professor Ware 
argues that “Hendrix was already out of step with the Supreme Court when it was decided in 1977, and it is 
now farther out of step with a modern Supreme Court.”  Ware, supra note 23, at 203; but see Matties, supra
note 39, 447 (arguing that despite its flaws in reasoning, Hendrix correctly recognized the importance of 
the civil jury in federal court); Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 23 at 677-680 (arguing that contractual 
waivers of jury trial rights are permissible only when the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intentional and 
identifying Hendrix as a “leading case”).  
Given that “lower courts have virtually uniformly held that such waivers are only valid when they 
meet a high standard variously expressed in words such as knowing, voluntary, and intentional,” Sternlight, 
Mandatory, supra note 23, at 679, this Article focuses on clarifying the allocation of the burden of proof 
when a party resists enforcement of a jury waiver and does not address whether the knowing consent 
standard is in fact the correct standard.
51
 565 F.2d 255, 258. 
52 Id.
53
  Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 23, at 678-79 (observing that courts use different combinations of 
knowing, voluntary and intentional to describe the standard).
13
agreement regarding what kinds of information is relevant. Courts 
typically consider any actual negotiations over the clause, whether the 
clause was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the conspicuousness of 
the waiver, the degree of bargaining disparity between the parties, and the 
experience and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver.  Courts 
have not been explicit as to how these factors relate to one another, but 
seem to consider them all together.54 
B. Allocation of the Burden of Proof55 
While courts may agree on the types of information relevant to the 
knowing and voluntary consent inquiry, many have failed to address “the 
important question” of which party bears the burden of proving that the waiver 
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.56 While some district courts have placed 
the burden of proof on the party seeking enforcement of the waiver,57 two circuits 
54
  Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 23, at 680-81.  Professor Sternlight provides a detailed discussion of 
the information courts typically find most relevant: (1) negotiability of the waiver; (2) conspicuousness of 
the waiver; (3) disparity of bargaining power between the parties; and (4) business or professional 
experience and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver.  See id. at 681-90. 
55 The Supreme Court recently observed that “[t]he term ‘burden of proof’ is one of the ‘slipperiest 
member[s] of the family of legal terms.’” Schaffer v. Weast,  -- U.S. --, 126 S. Ct. 528, 533, 163 L. Ed. 2d 
387, 395 (Nov. 14, 2005), citing, 2 J. Strong, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, p. 433 (5th ed.1999).  This 
is because the term “encompasses two separate burdens of proof.  One burden is that of producing evidence, 
satisfactory to the judge, of a particular fact in issue. The second is the burden of persuading the trier of fact 
that the alleged fact is true.” 2 J. Strong, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (5th ed.1999); see Schaffer v. 
Weast, 126 S. Ct. at 533-34 (Nov. 14, 2005), citing, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. 
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272, 114 S.Ct. 2251, 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994).  However, the term 
“burden of proof” is now generally limited to the burden of persuasion.  Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at
272-76.
56
 Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 23, at 691; see, e.g., Allyn v. Western United Life Assur. Co., 347 
F.Supp.2d 1246, 1251-52 (M.D.Fla. 2004) (noting that Eleventh Circuit had not resolved the burden 
question and declining to address it).
57 See, e.g., Morris, 2004 WL 306110, at *1; RDO Financial Services Co. v. Powell  191 F.Supp.2d 811, 
813 (N.D.Tex. 2002); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F.Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R.1996); Dreiling, 539 
F Supp at 403.
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have expressly split over the issue,58 and most other appellate courts have 
declined to resolve the question.59 
The confusion surrounding the allocation of the burden of proof may stem 
from the Hendrix court’s failure to elaborate on the origin of this presumption or 
explain how it was to be applied.  As support for its “presumption” the Hendrix 
court merely cites to the Supreme Court’s decision in Aetna Insurance Co. v. 
Kennedy.60 But while the Supreme Court did state in Aetna that “as the right of 
jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver,”61 Aetna involved a jury waiver during litigation and not a pre-dispute 
contractual jury waiver.62 As discussed infra, this is an important distinction that 
58 Compare Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that “the party 
seeking enforcement of the [jury] waiver must prove that consent was both voluntary and informed”), with, 
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that “in the context of an 
express contractual [jury] waiver the objecting party should have the burden of demonstrating that its 
consent to the provisions was not knowing and voluntary”). 
59
 See, e.g., Medical Air Technology Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002); Pierce v. 
Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 435 n. 4 (7th Cir.1997); Hulsey v. West, 966 F.2d 579, 
581 (10th Cir.1992). 
60 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937).
61
  301 U.S. at 393.
62
   The parties in Aetna, after introducing their evidence at trial and agreeing upon the amount of loss, each 
submitted requests for peremptory jury instructions and for a directed verdict in their respective favor. 301 
U.S. 389, 392.  The trial court refused to direct for either party and submitted the case to the jury.  Id.  The 
jury found for defendants and plaintiff appealed.  Id.  The appeals court found, inter alia, that “by their 
requests for peremptory instructions, plaintiff and defendants assumed the facts to be undisputed and 
submitted to the trial judge the determination of the inferences to be drawn from the evidence and so took 
the cases from the jury.”  Id.  The appeals court further held that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain 
verdicts for defendants and remanded the cases to the trial court with directions to give plaintiff judgment 
for the agreed amount of the loss.  Id.  The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning:
The established rule is that where plaintiff and defendant respectively request peremptory 
instructions, and do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be undisputed and in effect 
submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences properly to be drawn from them. . . . 
But, as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver. . . . Here neither the plaintiff nor the defendants applied for directed verdicts without more. 
With their requests for peremptory instructions they submitted other requests that reasonably may 
be held to amount to applications that, if a peremptory instruction is not given, the cases be 
submitted to the jury. Indeed, we find nothing in the record to support the view that the parties 
waived their right of trial by jury or authorized the judge to decide any issue of fact.
Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
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makes it difficult to analogize the reasoning in Aetna to cases involving pre-
dispute contractual jury waivers.63 
Those courts that have resolved the burden of proof question merely 
follow the pronouncements of Hendrix and Aetna without thorough analysis.64 
Some courts place the burden on the party seeking to avoid the waiver clause in 
order to preserve society’s interest in freedom of contract.65 Those courts that 
assign the burden to the party seeking to enforce the waiver clause contend that 
the interest in preserving freedom of contract is outweighed by society’s “greater 
interest in guarding the fundamental right to a jury.”66 The following 
examination of several recent employment cases that confront pre-dispute jury 
waivers highlights this disagreement. 
C. Review of Case Law Reveals Inconsistent Treatment of Waivers
I have found three federal opinions discussing employee challenges to pre-
dispute contractual jury waivers, all decided within the last several years.67 
Although this sample is small, given that the use of such waivers in the 
63 See infra notes 128-31 & accompanying text.
64 See, e.g., Leasing Service Corp., 804 F.2d at 833 (placing burden on party seeking enforcement of 
waiver and citing Hendrix but failing to distinguish the Sixth Circuit’s contrary holding in K.M.C. Co. v. 
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th Cir.1985)); Morris, 2004 WL 306110, at *1(concluding that 
party seeking enforcement of waiver has burden without analysis); Schappert, 2004 WL 1661073, at *11; 
RDO Financial Services Co., 191 F.Supp.2d at 813 (same); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd., 572 F.Supp. at 313 
(same).
65 See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 758.
66 See, e.g., Hydramar, Inc. v. General Dynamics Corp., 1989 WL 159267, at *2, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15784 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 29, 1989).
67
   There is a fourth case, Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Va. 2002), that 
addresses pre-dispute jury waivers in the context of an ADEA claim.  Although the employment agreement 
that plaintiff signed contained a jury waiver, the court found that the waiver did not conform to the 
requirements imposed by the OWBPA.  Id. at 581.  In finding that the OWBPA’s waiver requirements 
apply to procedural rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the court declined to follow several circuit court 
holdings to the contrary.  Id. at 579-80.  As of the date of this Article, no court has followed Hammaker’s
lead and one district court has specifically declined to do so.  See Schappert, 2004 WL 1661073, at *10.  Of 
more relevance to this Article, the Hammaker court also does not address the burden of proof question 
because it was undisputed that the waiver provision at issue did not conform to the OWBPA’s requirements.
See id. at 579.
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employment context is relatively new,68 and given the number of employment 
lawyers that are encouraging their clients to use them,69 litigation over such 
waivers is sure to increase.  In the meantime, an examination of these three 
initial cases suggests that employers should tread carefully as judicial treatment 
of such waivers has been unpredictable. 
 In Brown v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.,70 a terminated employee sued 
her employer for breach of employment contract and discrimination on the basis 
of “sex, pregnancy and childbirth” in violation of Title VII, the New York State 
Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.   
 A magistrate judge determined that plaintiff’s employment agreement, 
which provided, in part that, “[Employer] and Employee shall and hereby do 
waive a trial by jury in any action, proceeding or counter-claim brought or 
asserted by either of the parties hereto against the other on any matters 
whatsoever arising out of this Agreement” was a “‘contractual waiver of a 
jury trial [that] applies to all of [Plaintiff's] claims, including those arising under 
federal and state discrimination statutes.’”71 
68 See LeRoy, supra note 3, at 788-90 (noting that the small number of cases dealing with employee 
challenges to mandatory jury waivers “underestimates the prevalence of jury waivers” and may be just “the 
tip of a larger iceberg”).
69 See, e.g., Griffitts, supra note 24, at 2 (law firm newsletter noting more employers are using jury waivers 
in their employment agreements); Morse, Barnes-Brown & Pendleton, P.C., Employment Law Advisor 
(April 2004), available at http://www.mbbp.com/practices/employment/ela/ela%200404%20-
%20offer%20letters.pdf (law firm newsletter encouraging employers to consider using jury waivers); 
(Mark N. Reinharz & Terence M. O’Neil, Jury Waivers: An Alternative to Arbitration, The Nassau Lawyer 
(Oct. 2002), available at http://www.nassaubar.org/newsletter_article.cfm?ArticleID=79 (partners at the 
law firm of Rains & Pogrebin, P.C. encouraging employers to consider using jury waivers).
70 235 F.Supp.2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
71 Brown, 235 F.Supp.2d at 293 (emphasis original).
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The district court judge accepted the magistrate’s finding, noting that 
“[j]ury trial waivers are enforced if they are knowing and voluntary.”72 First, the 
court found that the jury waiver was a conspicuous part of plaintiff’s employment 
agreement.  Second, given that plaintiff had a M.B.A. from Harvard and had 
previously worked as an investment banker, the court found that she could “have 
negotiated about the clause if she tried.”73 The court rejected plaintiff’s argument 
that she did not read the employment agreement before signing it as having “no 
merit,” citing authority that absent fraud, duress or some other wrongful act, a 
party is bound by the contracts she signs whether or not the party has read the 
contract.74 
The Brown court did not explicitly address the proper allocation of the 
burden of proof.  However, the Brown court’s treatment of the waiver in question 
suggests that it placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff.  First, the court 
provides no support for its finding that the waiver was conspicuous.75 Second, 
although the plaintiff was highly educated and had worked as an investment 
banker, it does not necessarily follow that the clause was negotiable.  The court 
fails to cite any evidence of negotiability.76 There is also no evidence in the 
record that the plaintiff was represented by counsel during the formation of the 
72 Id.
73 Id. at 294.
74 Id.
75 Compare Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Crane, 36 F.Supp.2d 602, 603 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (finding a 
conspicuous jury waiver when it was written in all capital letters in the sole paragraph on the signature page 
itself, it was the last sentence in that paragraph, and it immediately preceded the parties’ signatures); see 
also Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 23, at 684-86 (“At a minimum, courts usually look to see that the 
typeface was not particularly small, and that the clause was not buried in a long agreement.”).
76 Compare Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 23, at 681-82 (noting that courts examine “both any 
negotiations that did take place regarding the clause, and also whether or not the clause was presented on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis”).
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agreement.77 The fact that the court ruled against the plaintiff despite these 
omissions,78 coupled with the court’s reliance on authority regarding consent to 
the unknown,79 suggest that it was placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff.  
By doing so, the Brown court was able to uphold the waiver despite the paucity of 
evidence showing knowing and voluntary consent to such a waiver. 
 In Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C.,80 plaintiff neurosurgeon was hired as 
Director of Neurological Surgery by defendant clinic.81 The contract required 
plaintiff to obtain an Iowa medical license and plaintiff claimed the clinic’s 
medical director represented to her that he had influence with the Iowa Board of 
Medical Examiners which would enable her to obtain her license within a few 
weeks.82 Plaintiff was subsequently unable to obtain her license and sued the 
clinic for, inter alia, fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.83 
Although Plaintiff demanded a jury trial, the court found that she had voluntarily 
and knowingly waived her right.84 
The court began by finding, with little analysis, that “the burden of 
demonstrating a voluntary and knowing waiver is on the proponent of the 
waiver.”85 The court then meticulously examined the formation of the agreement.  
77 Compare Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 23, at 689 (observing that “numerous courts have . . . 
voided waivers imposed on experienced business persons, particularly where the business person was not 
represented by an attorney”).
78 See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 272 (noting that burden of proof refers to “the notion that if the 
evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of [proof] must lose”).
79 See Ware, supra note 23, at 174 (stating that “a knowing-consent standard would generally depart form 
contract law’s norm of consent to the unknown—that is the usual practice of finding consent to form-
contract terms about which one party is ignorant”).
80 2004 WL 306110, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26639 (S.D.Iowa Jan. 29, 2004).
81 Id. at *1.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at *4.
85 Id. at *1.
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The court found evidence of negotiability given that: (1) the contract did 
not have the appearance of a standardized, take-it-or-leave it contract; (2) it was 
undisputed that plaintiff had actually negotiated changes in provisions of interest 
to her; and (3) there was evidence showing that plaintiff was “quite happy” with 
the contract.86 The court found that there was relative parity in bargaining power 
given plaintiff’s specialized qualifications and the clinic’s specific needs for 
someone with her qualifications.87 Observing that the waiver was on the fifth 
page of a six page agreement, that it was in all upper case letters, and set out in a 
separately numbered paragraph, the court found it to be conspicuous.88 With 
respect to plaintiff’s business acumen, the court found that she was well-educated 
and specifically noted that she was the contract negotiations manager at her prior 
clinic.89 Carefully considering all of these factors, the court found that 
defendants had met their burden and demonstrated that plaintiff had voluntarily 
and knowingly agreed to waive her right to trial by jury.90 
In Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Pub. Group, LLC,91 plaintiff 
filed suit against her prior employer alleging that she had been wrongly removed 
86 Id. at *2.
87 Id. at *3.
88 Id.
89 Id.  Although plaintiff also argued that she did not have the opportunity to discuss the agreement with a 
lawyer, after reviewing the evidence surrounding the formation of the contract and noting that plaintiff 
never sought more time to review the contract, the court discounted this argument.  Id. at *4.
90 Id. at *4.  It is noteworthy that the court made this finding with some reluctance.  Id. at *5 (“Given the 
importance of the jury in the history and fabric of our society, the diminishing number of civil jury trials in 
recent years in our district and in the state courts of Iowa is a trend this Court is not at all anxious to 
encourage. However, the right to jury trial clearly may be waived and there are many legitimate reasons 
why parties may wish to do so. Parties are free to enter into agreements as to how they will resolve disputes 
that may arise in a business or professional relationship. When they have voluntarily and knowingly elected 
to give up the right to trial by jury it is incumbent on a court to enforce the agreement just as it would be to 
enforce the right to trial by jury in the absence of such an agreement.”).
91 2004 WL 1661073, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14153 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004).
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from her position on the basis of her age and gender.92 Defendants moved to 
strike plaintiff’s jury demand.93 
The court first noted that the “burden of demonstrating a plaintiff has 
waived her right to a jury trial is on the defendant.”94 Like the court in Morris,
the Schappert court then proceeded to carefully apply the knowing consent 
standard.   
 The court found that the terms were negotiable given plaintiff’s admission 
that the agreement had been negotiated and amended to reflect changes made to 
the financial terms.95 The court found evidence that the waiver provision was 
conspicuous.96 With respect to bargaining power, the court stated that the fact 
that plaintiff negotiated material terms of the agreement belied her argument 
that there was a gross inequality in bargaining power.97 Plaintiff also did not 
point to any material negative consequences of not signing the agreement and did 
not deny that she could have retained her job without signing the agreement, 
further demonstrating her bargaining power.98 Finally, plaintiff herself testified 
that she was a “smart,” “savvy,” “well educated,” and “experienced” business 
person and that she had over two years to have the provision reviewed by her 
attorneys.99 Given all these facts, the court found that defendants had met their 
92 Id. at *1.
93 Id. at *9.
94 Id. at *11.  
95 Id. at *11.  The court did not address plaintiff’s argument that she understood that she had no choice but 
to accept the non-financial terms.  Id. at *10.
96 Id. at *11.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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burden of showing that plaintiff had knowingly and voluntarily waived her right 
to a jury trial.100 
A review of the opinions in Brown, Morris and Schappert reveals that 
courts are still grappling with the proper allocation of the burden of proof when a 
party resists enforcement of a contractual jury waiver.  Such inconsistencies 
make it difficult to predict whether a pre-dispute jury waiver will be enforced as 
shifting the burden of proof directly changes the nature of the inquiry.  When the 
party resisting the waiver bears the burden of proof, as in Brown, a jury waiver 
can be upheld following only a superficial inquiry.  In contrast, when the burden 
of proof is assigned to the party seeking to enforce the waiver, as in Morris and 
Schappert, the court conducts an exhaustive factual inquiry into the formation of 
the agreement before upholding a jury waiver.  This unpredictability diminishes 
the potential value of such waivers to employers and employees alike.  In order to 
encourage the appropriate use of pre-dispute jury waivers, courts must clarify the 
process through which they analyze such waivers, allocating the burden of proof 
in a way that takes into account public policy considerations as well as 
convenience and fairness concerns.   
III. Allocating the Burden of Proof
Since most courts substantially agree on what information is relevant 
when determining whether a contractual waiver of a jury trial right was entered 
into knowingly and voluntarily,101 allocation of the burden of proof will often be 
determinative.   When the legislature is silent on the burden of proof, courts 
100 Id.
101 See supra note 54; LaRocca, supra note 3, at 944 & 944 n.69.
22
ordinarily allocate the burden to the party initiating the proceeding and seeking 
relief.102 But several factors such as public policy considerations, and 
convenience and fairness concerns, may support a different allocation of the 
burden.103 A closer examination of pre-dispute contractual waivers against this 
backdrop suggests that a different allocation of the burden is warranted when 
such waivers are included in employment agreements. 
A. What is Actually Being Waived?
A pre-dispute contractual jury waiver brings two basic societal interests 
into sharp relief:  the right to a trial by jury and freedom of contract.  “The 
resolution of civil disputes by jury is of historic and fundamental importance.”104 
On the other hand, parties have the right to contract as they see fit as long as 
their agreement does not violate law or public policy.105 Accordingly, these two 
interests must be weighed against one another to determine the proper allocation 
of the burden of proof.  As explained, infra, because pre-dispute jury waivers 
102 Schaffer, 126 S.Ct. at 527 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Congress has not explicitly addressed jury 
waivers in the employment context.  See Matties, supra note 39, at 443 (stating that no federal statute or 
rule specifically allows parties to waive their right to a jury trial by way of prelitigation contract); see also
David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private 
Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1085, 1114-1119
(2002) (characterizing the enforcement of jury waivers as a “judicial creation”). 
103 Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 537-38 (Nov. 14, 2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Strong, supra note 55, at § 
337, p. 415.
104 Morris, 2004 WL 306110, at *11.  For a discussion of the important purposes jury trials serve, see
Matties, supra note 39, at 434-440.
105 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 129 & 129 n. 11, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1104 (Tex.
2004); see, e.g., American Anglian Environmental Technologies, L.P. v. Environmental Management Corp.  
412 F.3d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that it is the policy of Missouri and nine other states “to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements” 
and collecting statutes); Badgett v. Federal Express Corp.  378 F.Supp.2d 613, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2005) 
(noting the importance of the parties' freedom of contract absent clear policy to the contrary); Allan Block 
Corp. v. E. Dillon & Co.  2005 WL 1593010, *8 (D.Minn. 2005), citing, Arrowhead Elec. Coop., Inc. v. 
LTV Steel Mining Co., 568 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn.Ct.App.1997) (“Public policy ‘requires that freedom 
of contract shall remain inviolate, except only in cases which contravene public right or the public 
welfare.’”); see also Paul v. Davis  424 U.S. 693, 722 n.10, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1170 n.10 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (observing that the Constitution contains some protections of the right of the individual to 
contract); but see U.S. v. Antzoulatos  962 F.2d 720, 725 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that any substantive due 
process right to contract “has been sharply curtailed”).
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interfere with the role of the jury and our public system of dispute resolution, 
public policy considerations counsel against emphasizing private contractual 
autonomy over the right to a jury trial.   
 First, pre-dispute jury waivers impinge upon the role of the jury within our 
constitutional structure.  The Seventh Amendment does not merely confer an 
individual jury-trial right, but also acts as a structural constraint on the power of 
the sovereign and the judge.106 Indeed, some have called the jury “a primary 
check on judges’ power.”107 Thus, a jury waiver presents judges with the 
opportunity to substantially increase their own power by eliminating this check.    
 The Supreme Court has recently highlighted the tension between a judge’s 
power, as opposed to the jury’s, in the criminal context.108 In U.S. v. Booker,109 
the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”),110 observing that allowing judges to find facts that enhanced a 
defendant’s sentence impermissibly served to “increase the judge’s power and 
106
  Sternlight, Mandatory, supra note 23, at 672; Matties, supra note 39, at 439-40.  In an impassioned 
concurrence to an opinion addressing pre-dispute arbitration clauses, Montana Supreme Court Justice 
Nelson states:  
[T]he importance of the right of trial by jury derives from it having “developed in harmony with 
our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.”  “Since the time of 
the Magna Carta, ‘trial by jury has been prized as a shield against oppression . . . [and] the 
approaches of arbitrary power.’” This entitlement has been “long thought to be a safeguard against 
tyranny.” The right to trial by jury is a “jealously protected safeguard against government 
oppression.” And, “[t]he guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and [Montana] State Constitutions 
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which the law should be enforced and justice 
administered.”
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 310 Mont. 123, 139-140, 54 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted).
107
   Matties, supra note 39, at 465.
108 U.S. v. Booker, -- U.S. --, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding that a sentencing judge 
violates the Sixth Amendment by imposing an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was 
not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant). 
109
-- U.S. --, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
110
   Prior to Booker, the Guidelines were a mandatory determinate sentencing scheme applicable to federal 
crimes that decreed sentences within set sentencing ranges but further allowed a judge to enhance or depart 
from such ranges based on facts found by the judge.  See Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 750 -752 (2005).
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diminish that of the jury.”111 The Booker Court characterized its invalidation of 
the mandatory Guidelines as preserving the right of jury trial, thereby 
“guaranteeing that the jury would still stand between the individual and the 
power of the government.”112 
Admittedly, waivers of constitutional rights are treated differently in the 
criminal context than in the civil context.113 This distinction has been criticized 
given that the Supreme Court has “never explained why constitutionally 
protected rights should be afforded any less protection in the civil context than in 
the criminal context.”114 While this Article does not urge the adoption of a 
criminal waiver standard, the Court’s pronouncements in the criminal context 
support the assertion that the jury plays an important role as a check on the 
judiciary and the sovereign.  Placing the burden of proof on the party seeking 
enforcement of the waiver would therefore reemphasize the role of the jury as a 
limiting force on judicial discretion and power.  
 Second, pre-dispute jury waivers undermine a party’s procedural right to a 
jury trial as enshrined within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).  
Specifically, FRCP 38(a) declares: “The right of trial by jury as declared by the 
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United 
111 Id. at 751.
112 Id. at 752; see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2538-39, 159 L.Ed.2d 
403 (2004) (“[The right of jury trial] is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of 
power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative 
and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”).
113 See Ware, supra note 23, at 181-82.
114
   Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
Arbitration, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 56-57 (1997).  Professor Ware posits that one of the reasons that the 
Supreme Court is less protective of civil waivers is that such waivers are contractual and thus present less 
danger of overreaching and duress by the party seeking to enforce the waiver. See Ware, supra note 23, at 
182 n. 88.  This Article argues, however, that given the disparity in bargaining power and legal expertise 
between employer and employee, such a danger is often present in the employment context.  See infra Part 
III.B. 
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States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.”115 A party that wants a jury 
trial must demand one in accordance with FRCP 38; failure to do so constitutes a 
waiver by the party of trial by jury.116 FRCP 39(b) further allows the court 
discretion to order a trial by jury notwithstanding the failure of a party to 
properly demand a jury.117 
Two of the main goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were to 
establish national uniformity in procedure and to eliminate technical traps found 
in earlier procedural codes.118 These rules were the product of much debate and 
deliberation by public bodies,119 and are an integral part of a public system 
constructed to enable peaceful and orderly resolution of disputes.   A pre-dispute 
jury waiver circumvents the rules by establishing a different set of procedures for 
the parties bound to it and arguably allows private parties to contractually limit 
the court’s discretion to order a trial by jury.120 Enforcement of such a waiver 
115 Id.
116
   FRCP 38(d).  It is important to note the waiver provided for in FRCP 38(d), which occurs during 
litigation and is specifically authorized by the established rules of our procedural system, does not present 
the same problems as a pre-dispute jury waiver.  See infra, notes 128-31& accompanying text; Taylor & 
Cliffe, supra note 102, at 1104-07.  As stated by the California Supreme Court:  “the initiation of a 
lawsuit . . . focus[es] the attention of the litigants to produce a considered decision whether to demand—
and pay for—a jury trial based on an informed understanding of the stakes involved.” Grafton Partners 
L.P., 36 Cal. 4th at 964.  Moreover, “[o]nce litigation commences and the time to demand a jury trial 
approaches, parties ordinarily have counsel and their decision whether to demand jury trial is likely to be a 
part of their litigation strategy.” Id.  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit observed that this rule “respecting timely 
demand for trial by jury is a reasonable requirement calculated to insure the orderly presentation of the 
business of the court.” K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 756 n.4. 
117 Id. (“Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, 
notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have 
been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues.”); 
see John D. Perovich, Discretion of District Court Under Rule 39(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Authorizing it to Order Jury Trial Notwithstanding Party’s Failure to Make Seasonable Demand for Jury, 
6 A.L.R. Fed. 217 § 4 (2005) (discussing extent of court’s discretion to order jury trial).
118
 Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 102, at 1103; see also Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 593, 602 (2005) (“The Rules, expressive of and coupled with an impressive investment in 
the infrastructure of the federal courts, represent a normative commitment to federal regulatory power.”).
119
  Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 102, at 1100.
120
 Once a pre-litigation agreement is found to be valid, “courts in near knee-jerk fashion provide automatic 
specific performance without acknowledging any necessity for first examining the prerequisites for specific 
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thus defeats the goal of uniformity by allowing “privately tailored procedure for 
individual suits.”121 
Contractual jury waivers also favor those parties with the means and the 
ability to strategically exploit such waivers to their advantage;122 and in the 
context of employment agreements, that party is the employer.123 Therefore, 
these waivers not only impose procedures inconsistent with publicly-established 
ones, but fashion those procedures in such a way as to favor the same party 
nearly every time:  the employer.  
 A court that blindly espouses freedom of contract concerns when 
examining a pre-dispute jury waiver ignores the role of the jury as a check on the 
government’s power as well as the waiver’s encroachment upon our public 
dispute resolution system.  This concern is especially acute when the system is 
disrupted in such a way as to consistently favor the same party.  In recognition of 
society’s interest in a public dispute resolution system that is fundamentally fair 
and the disruptive effect of a jury waiver on the fairness of that system, the 
burden of proof should be placed on the party seeking to enforce the waiver.  
B. The Coercive Employer-Employee Relationship
Employers possess distinct advantages over employees in both bargaining 
power and in their ability to assess the feasibility and the likely benefit of 
alternative dispute resolution methods.  These advantages, as well as the risk of 
coercion inherent in the employer-employee relationship, decrease the 
performance or injunctive relief required for a ‘normal’ contract.’”  Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 102, at 
1127.
121
  Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 102, at 1127.
122 Id. at 1103-04.
123 See infra, Part III.B.
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probability that knowing and voluntary consent to a jury waiver can be obtained.  
These considerations further support placing the burden of proof on the party 
seeking to enforce the pre-dispute jury waiver.   
 Employment contracts “are susceptible to the presence of unconscionable 
terms,”124 because they are typically offered on a “take-it or leave-it” basis, 
drafted entirely by employers, and offered for employees to sign as a condition of 
employment.125 Most applicants lack bargaining power because rejecting the 
employment agreement is not a viable alternative.126 This dilemma discourages 
applicants from exercising any effort to understand what they are waiving.127 
124 Gooden v. Village Green Management Co., 2002 WL 31557689, at *3, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22365 
(D.Minn. Nov. 15, 2002) (noting that the “unique nature” of employment contracts “should subject them to 
special scrutiny”); see Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 102, at 1087 (noting that “there is a great opportunity for 
unfairness” when pre-litigation agreements are incorporated into employment agreements).
125 Gooden, 2002 WL 31557689, at *3; see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams  532 U.S. 105, 139, 121 
S.Ct. 1302, 1321 - 1322 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that many employees lack bargaining 
power); Daniel Roy, Note, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After 
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 Ind. L.J. 1347, 1360 (1999) (“When employees are 
presented with such form agreements, they are not ‘asked’ by their employers to accept, or make a counter-
offer. They are instead required to accept, or look for another job.”); Steven Cherensky, Note, A Penny for 
Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 
Cal. L. Rev. 597, 621 (1993) (“Today, the majority of employment contracts are offered on a ‘take-it-or-
leave-it’ basis.”).
126 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 115, 6 P.3d 669
(Cal. 2000) (observing that “the economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after 
employees may be particularly acute” and that “few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of 
an arbitration requirement”); Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 Or. L. Rev. 
861, 871 (2004) (“In the end, the employee's choice is between a job in which employment discrimination 
disputes are arbitrated and no job whatsoever. Such a choice is really no choice at all.”); Lucy T. France & 
Timothy C. Kelly, Mandatory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims in the Workplace: No Enforceability 
Without Equivalency, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 449, 463 (2003) (“Most employees lack bargaining power. Rarely 
do non-management level employees negotiate the terms of their employment at arms length.”); Reilly, 
supra note 23, at 1258-1259 (arguing that efforts to find other jobs are curtailed by limited information and 
resources and by the view that jobs are a person’s most valuable possession and that meaningful choices 
between jobs assumes worker mobility and healthy job market); William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. 
Kidd, Jr., Modifications Necessary for Commercial Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against 
Discrimination in Employment: A Discussion and Proposals for Change, 14 O hio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 29, 
72 -73 (1998) (noting employees may lack the personal economic security and effective bargaining power 
to avoid unfavorable terms in employment agreements).
127
   Reilly, supra note 23, at 1235 (“A potential employee is unlikely to devote resources to try to 
understand something the he or she cannot change or escape.”).
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Even if an applicant wishes to carefully deliberate over the terms of the 
proffered employment agreement, and is granted the opportunity to do so, most 
lack the means to adequately evaluate the impact of a jury waiver.  By definition, 
a pre-dispute jury waiver is presented and agreed to prior to litigation.  Thus, at 
the time the right is waived, it is extremely difficult to anticipate the nature of the 
dispute that may arise from the agreement.  Yet the nature of the dispute is a 
crucial factor when considering whether to ask for a jury trial.128 Cases with 
simple issues and good witnesses and which involve the potential for emotionally 
based damages are often the best in which to demand a jury.129 Complex cases, 
and those cases that rely heavily on legal issues, are poorer for jury treatment.130 
The nature of the actual dispute also appreciably affects the cost-benefit analysis, 
as cases tried to a jury cost more than those tried to a judge.131 
Employers are “repeat players in the employment marketplace”132 and are 
more educated and skilled in legal matters than employees. Thus, they are more 
likely to take these concerns into account, given that they have better access to 
legal information, greater expertise with drafting and negotiating employment 
agreements, and more experience with taking cases to trial.   
 Most employees, on the other hand, do not even think that sometime in 
the future they may become involved in a legal dispute with their employer, let 
alone carefully weigh the ramifications of something as abstract as waiving their 
right to a jury trial in a case that has yet to be filed, regarding a dispute that has 
128
  Custis, supra note 13, at § 8:32.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132
   Reilly, supra note 23, at 1236-37.
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yet to materialize.133 Their ignorance of the law134 and other “cognitive biases”135 
prevent employees from realizing the significance of what they are agreeing to.  
Therefore, at the time the waiver is entered into, most employees have not 
adequately considered the consequences of waiving their right to a jury.   
 This disparity in power, expertise and resources creates a two-fold 
problem for employees.  The employer’s greater expertise and resources produces 
employment agreements that are naturally drafted in terms that favor the 
employer.  This means that the employer determines whether or not a jury waiver 
provision will be inserted into the employment agreement in the first instance.  
And since employees are in the unenviable position of having neither bargaining 
power nor legal expertise, these employment agreements, which already heavily 
favor the employer, are rarely negotiated.  Consequently, employment 
agreements, and jury waivers in particular, are entered into with little 
deliberation by the employee, despite the evident biases against them.   
 Clearly, the employer’s resources and expertise make it better able to 
demonstrate that a pre-dispute jury waiver was entered into knowingly and 
voluntarily.  However, this is not the only reason it should bear the burden of 
133 See Reilly, supra note 23, at 1229-30 (noting that many employees dismiss the possibility of engaging 
in a dispute with their employers); see also Howard v. Bank South, N.A., 209 Ga.App. 407, 410, 433 
S.E.2d 625, 628 (Ga. App. 1993) (finding that since plaintiff could not have known when he signed the 
contract what the basis and circumstances of a future claim on that contract might be, his waiver of jury 
trial could not have been knowing and voluntary).
134
   Reilly, supra note 23, at 1225 (“Most employees have little knowledge of their legal rights in 
employment.”).
135
   Some cognitive biases include a systematic underestimation of risk and the use of a small sample of 
positive or neutral interactions as reliable predictors of the relationship in the future. Reilly, supra note 23, 
at 1228-34.
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proof.136 A frequent significant consideration in the allocation of the burden of 
proof is the judicial estimate of the probabilities of the situation.137 That is, “it is 
usually fairer to act as if the exceptional situation did not exist and therefore to 
place the burden of proof and persuasion on the party claiming its existence.”138 
With respect to pre-dispute jury waivers entered into between employers and 
employees, knowing and voluntary consent to such a waiver would be exceptional, 
given the employer’s natural advantages in light of the employee’s natural 
disadvantages, and the likelihood of bias and coercion.  As an example, consider 
Elizabeth, the hypothetical employee presented at the beginning of this Article.  
Elizabeth has only a high school education and applied for an entry-level job with 
a large corporation.  Her education level, the complexity of the legal right being 
waived, and the large number of potential applicants qualified for that same 
position make it highly unlikely that her employer invested the time required to 
ensure that Elizabeth’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.  This probability, 
coupled with the fact that the employer has better access to legal information and 
greater resources, warrant assigning the burden to the employer. 
C. Assigning the Burden of Proof
Allocating the burden of proof to the party seeking enforcement of the 
waiver strikes the appropriate balance between freedom of contract and the right 
to a jury trial.139 First, employment agreements are uniquely susceptible to unfair 
136 See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, Schaffer, --- U.S. ---, 126 S. Ct. 528,
163 L. Ed. 2d (2005) (noting that courts “do not automatically assign the burden of proof to the side with 
the bigger guns”).
137 Strong, supra note 55, at § 337.
138 Id.
139 But see Joel Andersen, Note, The Indulgence of Reasonable Presumptions: Federal Court Contractual 
Civil Jury Trial Waivers, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 104, 112 & 112 n.50 (2003).  Andersen advocates for the use 
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terms.  Second, the parties to those agreements differ greatly with respect to their 
bargaining power and legal sophistication.  Third, it is more likely than not that a 
jury waiver will not be entered into knowingly and voluntarily.  Fourth, pre-
dispute jury waivers diminish the role of the jury and circumvent our public 
dispute resolution system.  Thus, sound public policy, convenience and fairness 
concerns all establish that the burden of demonstrating that a jury waiver was 
voluntary and knowing is properly placed on the proponent of the waiver.  
 Applying this allocation to the Brown case demonstrates how significantly 
it can affect the outcome.  In Brown, plaintiff claims that her waiver was not 
knowing and voluntary.  Accordingly, her employer must now persuade the court 
that plaintiff’s waiver was knowing and voluntary in light of the following factors: 
(1) negotiability of the contract terms; (2) conspicuousness of the waiver 
provision; (3) the relative bargaining power of the parties; and (4) the business 
acumen of the party opposing the waiver.  The employer presents evidence that 
the waiver is conspicuous and that plaintiff has a M.B.A. from Harvard and was 
formerly employed as an investment banker.  No evidence is presented regarding 
the negotiability of the contract terms or the relative bargaining power of the 
parties.  In fact, plaintiff presents evidence that she did not even read the waiver 
of a permissive presumption in cases involving pre-dispute jury waivers.  Id. at 111.  Using the permissive 
presumption, if a party claims her waiver was not knowing and voluntary then the court may find that there 
was no waiver even if her claim is the only evidence.  Id. at 116-17.  However, the court may still find 
against the party resisting enforcement of the waiver if the evidence is “weak.”  Id. at 117.  Andersen 
argues that this presumption protects the right to a jury trial and the contractual interests of the parties while 
leaving intact the “normal mechanisms found in an ordinary contract dispute.”  Id. According to Anderson, 
shifting the burden of production and persuasion to the party seeking to enforce the waiver does not 
adequately protect freedom of contract.  Id. at 116 n. 86.  But, as argued in this Article, in the context of 
employment agreements, society’s interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by the right to a jury trial.  
Furthermore, convenience and fairness concerns warrant assigning the burden of proof to the party with 
greater expertise and resources, and the party claiming the existence of an unlikely situation, which in most 
cases is an employer seeking enforcement of a pre-dispute jury waiver. 
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before signing it.  Because the burden of proof is on the employer, failure to 
present any evidence to suggest that the contract terms were negotiable and/or 
that the plaintiff had some modicum of bargaining power means that the 
employer has not satisfied its burden.  In light of the evidence presented, the 
court would clearly find that the employer failed to meet its burden and would 
disregard the waiver.  
CONCLUSION
Bench trials offer employers and employees distinct advantages over 
arbitration and jury trials.  But as parties attempt to leverage these advantages by 
using pre-dispute contractual jury waivers to manage litigation risk and cost, it is 
important to clarify judicial enforcement of such waivers to encourage their 
thoughtful and appropriate use.  This Article argues that public policy 
considerations, coupled with convenience and fairness concerns, call for 
assigning the burden of proving the validity of a pre-dispute contractual jury 
waiver to the party seeking enforcement of the waiver.  By assigning the burden 
of proof in this way, courts can ensure that such waivers are treated consistently.  
Consistent judicial treatment of pre-dispute contractual waivers will, in turn, 
allow both employers and employees alike to utilize such waivers where 
appropriate.   
